Logical positivism & the theory of relativity. A case study: Hans Reichenbach

Ever since the dawn of western philosophy people have wondered what is the true path to knowledge. Is it to be derived from some 'higher', ideal world, or should it be the result of observation? This question was answered negatively by the 18th century Scottish philosopher Hume, who showed that knowledge can never be certain. Kant solved this problem by formulating his doctrine of the 'synthetic a priori'.

The topic considered in this presentation is the influence exerted by the theory of relativity on the above-mentioned philosophical debate. The new school in philosophy to result from this is called 'logical positivism'. In this presentation I will focus on an important logical positivist: Hans Reichenbach. First I will briefly outline the 'standard picture' of Reichenbach's role in this new school. After that, I will describe a severe critique on this picture by a contemporary philosopher of science, Michael Friedman. Subsequently, I will evaluate the 'standard picture' and Friedman's account by weighing them against the words of Reichenbach himself. We will see that both accounts err in an important respect.