Constructive empiricism, partial structures and the modal interpretation of quantum mechanics

Van Fraassen's modal interpretation of quantum mechanics (QM) is articulated to support an anti-realist account of QM. However, given the particular form of van Fraassen's anti-realism (constructive empiricism), two problems arise when we try to make it compatible with the modal interpretation: one difficulty concerns the tension between the need for modal operators in the modal interpretation and van Fraassen's scepticism with regard to real modalities in nature (van Fraassen [1989]); another addresses the need for the truth predicate in the modal interpretation and van Fraassen's rejection of truth as the aim of science (van Fraassen [1980]). After examining these two problems, I suggest a formal framework in which they can be accommodated - using da Costa and French's partial structures approach - and indicate a variant of van Fraassen's modal interpretation that does not face these difficulties