Values in science; A critical analysis of four aspects

I will give a critical analysis of the values in science debate between the adherents to the value-free ideal and the social constructivists. Moreover, I will eludicate one of the main conclusions of my dissertation, namely that it is not the kinds of values that are involved in science, but rather the role they play, that is most important when one wishes to look at the influence of values on scientific theories and results. This is arguably a new strand in this debate. I will contend that there are three sorts of properties that theory choice may be based on: epistemic criteria (like internal consistency), values that are used in a detached manner (that will no longer be appealed to if new evidence comes to light), and values that are used in an attached manner. I will argue that these categories of roles are more useful than categories of kinds of values, and conclude that the central question in the discussion of values in science is not whether values are cognitive, but rather if they are used in a detached manner.